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Abstract  
Victimisation from cybercrime has increased exponentially over the past decade. Frontline 
police officers are dealing with a variety of crimes different than those existing in an era before 
the advent of digital technology. Frontline officers are expected to encourage members of the 
public to report such crimes, to investigate them, as well as keeping up-to-date with the latest 
developments in this ever-changing landscape. This study explored the issues that frontline 
officers are dealing with on a daily basis when it comes to cybercrime. 16 front line police 
officers took part in focus groups exploring key questions around aspects of cybercrime. The 
key themes discussed in this article include the difficulty of defining what is cybercrime, the 
contrast between the speed of developments in cybercrime and the speed of investigation, and 
the ineffectiveness of current training. The results are discussed in the context of a need for 
clearer training information to be delivered to all officers and staff who come into contact with 
aspects of cybercrime. 
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Introduction  
The current level of reported cybercrimes in the UK for adults stands at approximately 4.7 
million incidents in the year ending September 2017 (British Crime Survey, 2017). The level of 
victimisation from cybercrime has a respective knock-on effect for individual police forces 
around the UK, who are expected to provide an effective and agile response to victims (Holt & 
Bossler, 2012). In an effort to maintain such a response, a variety of assumptions in relation to 
frontline officers’ knowledge and understanding of an ever-changing and complex environment 
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are made (Holt & Bossler, 2012). These assumptions include all officers having a full 
understanding of key definitions and terms related to cybercrime, having knowledge of the 
required routes for investigation and evidence gathering, and of there being effective training 
in place which supports officers in advising (potential) victims as to the best course of action 
(Holt & Bossler, 2012). This study aimed to explore frontline officers’ current knowledge in 
relation to cybercrime. It also shed light on their key concerns and perceived issues which 
included frustrations related to lack of knowledge and power to deal with cybercrime, The 
contrast between the speed at which cybercrime develops versus the speed of investigation, 
and a perceived lack of specialist resources. Officers also drew attention to the ineffectiveness 
of current training provision.  
 
Literature Review 
Defining Cybercrime  
The concept of cybercrime has evolved in a number of distinct ways over recent years, 
particularly in the light of technological developments (Holt, Bossler, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2015; 
Wall, 2001). Aligned with this, the way in which the concept has been defined has also gone 
through a number of reiterations, in turn creating potential confusion for both law enforcement 
and the public alike (Wall, 2007). Cybercrime has been frequently dichotomized into different 
categories, based on the motives and target(s) of the attack. The most frequently used 
classification distinguishes between two main categories, these being ‘ cyber-dependent’ and 
‘cyber-enabled’ (HM Government, 2016; McGuire & Dowling, 2013; Wall, 2008). Cyber-
dependent crimes are those that can only be committed using computers or computer-related 
technology, such as the spreading of malware or denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In contrast, 
cyber-enabled crimes can be conducted both on and offline, with online aspects serving to 
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increase both the speed and scale of such crimes (National Crime Agency, 2016). Research has 
noted at that a lack of agreement related to how cybercrime is defined has generated a degree 
of confusion in the public, particularly in relations to which crimes fall under which categories 
(Wall, 2008a, 2008b). There is often an assumption that those in law enforcement who deal 
with aspects of these crimes on a daily basis have a clearer understanding of these categories 
and crime inclusion. However, as will be discussed in the next section, such an assumption may 
be misplaced. 
 
Police Officers’ Views and Knowledge of Cybercrime  
Whilst the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime has received a lot of attention there has 
been a limited number of studies looking directly at police officers’ perceptions of cybercrime 
(Bossler & Holt, 2012; Hinduja, 2004; Holt & Bossler, 2012). Often, police therefore it is 
important for them to have adequate knowledge and understanding of the area (Holt & Bossler, 
2012). Although police officers understand the complexity and seriousness of cybercrime, their 
perceptions are often outside of the empirical evidence (Senjo, 2004). Senjo (2004) noted that 
police officers often based their perceptions of cybercrime on mass media depictions, 
something that Wall (2008a) also noted in terms of the public’s perceptions. The research also 
noted that perceptions of cybercrime were heavily influenced by age, level of experience of 
these crimes, political pressures on investigation priorities, and a lack of relevant information 
(Senjo, 2004).  
 
A perceived lack of specialized training provision has also been mentioned in previous studies 
(Davis, 2011; Hinduja, 2004). Law enforcement staff often present feelings of inadequacy and 
of being ill-equipped to deal with crimes related to digital technologies and the Internet. The 
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general consensus from research findings suggests that police officers desire more training and 
guidance when it comes to investigating cybercrime (Hinduja, 2004). They also recognise a need 
for more specialized training when it comes to the collection and processing of digital evidence 
(Hinduja, 2004). Burns, Whitworth, & Thompson (2004) also draw attention to a lack of 
resources, including staff and training. Burns et al. (2004) note that a persistent societal 
preoccupation with traditional offline crime puts more pressure on devoting essential 
resources to these types of offences rather than those involving cybercrime. This work focuses 
directly on US law enforcement, while studies of the UK policing of cybercrime are still in their 
infancy. 
 
The research discussed above highlights a number of challenges which frontline officers 
encounter when dealing which cybercrime on a daily basis. This includes dealing directly with 
members of the public and advising them on a best course of action, and also aspects related 
to investigation and evidence gathering. At present, scarce research has been conducted into 
how frontline officers in the UK (in the case of this study – in England) view the concept of 
cybercrime, the challenges they face, and their perceptions related to the effectiveness of 
training. The aim of this study was therefore to delve into this issue deeper by asking a group 
of frontline officers, who come into contact with aspects of cybercrime on a daily basis as part 
of their operational roles, about their experiences. By gaining a deeper understanding of the 
issues these officers face, it is envisaged that areas of potential weakness can be identified, 
with the aim of developing more innovative and effective routes for training and awareness.   
 
 
Methods 
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Participants  
The study was a qualitative exploration of frontline police officers’ perceptions of cybercrime 
at a mid-sized police force in England. A purposive sampling technique was employed, with a 
total of 16 actively serving police officers were recruited to take part in the study. The officers 
in question were all part of the same regional force, with the region covering predominately 
large urban conurbations, but also included considerable rural areas. In the context of cyber 
crime, the force deals with a significant portion of crimes involving a cyber enabled element, as 
well as having an Economic Crime Unit (ECU) dealing specifically with online fraud. Each officer 
had a minimum of 18 months’ service within the force and they were recruited from various 
operational backgrounds. Drawing on participants from wide variety operational 
responsibilities was deemed important to ensure as many experiences were explored. The 
breakdown of the focus groups according to operational background is presented in table 1 
below.  
 
Table 1: Focus group break down according to operational background  
 Participants Operational background 
Focus Group 1  
(Female) 
Respondent 1 (RS1) Control Room Operations; Respondent 2 
(RS2) Control Room Operations; Respondent 3 (RS3) 
Investigations Management Unit; Respondent 4 (RS4) Incident 
Response 
Focus Group 2 
(Male) 
Respondent 3 (RS3) Control Room Operations, Respondent 4 
(RS4) Control Room Operations, Respondent 2 (RS2) 
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Investigations Management Unit, Respondent 1 (RS1) Control 
Room Organisation Team  
Focus Group 3 
(Female) 
Respondent 2 (RS2) Investigations Management Unit, 
Respondent 1 (RS1) Call Management Team, Respondent 3 (RS3) 
Managed Appointment Unit, Respondent 4 (RS4) Managed 
Appointment Unit. 
Focus Group 4 
(Male0 
Respondent 1 (RS1) Managed Appointment Unit*, Respondent 2 
(RS2) Patrol and Resolution Officer, Respondent 3 (RS3) 
Investigation Management Unit, Respondent 4 (RS4) 
Investigation Management Unit.  
*Managed Appointment Unit – members of the public can arrange to meet a police officer 
within a specific time period for non-emergency matters 
 
Focus Groups 
A focus group schedule was designed to explore: officers’ knowledge and definitions of 
cybercrime (e.g. How do you define cybercrime?; What key activities do you associate with 
cybercrime?); attitudes towards cybercrime and victimisation (What risks are there online? 
Who do you think is targeted by cybercrime?); and aspects of training and learning (How have 
you learned about cybercrime? Who would you listen to about cybercrime?).  
 
Before the focus groups, all participants were provided with a detailed information sheet 
outlining their right to withdraw, informed consent and information about protection of 
anonymity and the purpose of the research. Participants were also given a verbal debrief at the 
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conclusion of the focus groups, as well as being given a written debriefing sheet detailing the 
purpose of the research and the contact details of the lead researcher. 
 
The focus groups were each held in a private meeting room at a local police station. Before the 
focus groups began, participants were asked to give a brief overview of themselves and their 
current role. Each focus group lasted for approximately one hour and they were all audio 
recorded and fully transcribed by an independent transcription company.  
 
Analysis  
Data were analysed using inductive thematic analysis, following the steps outlined by (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006): familiarisation with the data; generation of initial codes; searching for and 
creating themes; reviewing themes; and, refining and naming the themes. Inductive thematic 
analysis is data-driven, meaning that theme development was not restricted by the researcher’s 
interest in the area (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Another researcher reviewed all transcripts in order 
to check for validity of the analysis. No differences were reported in relation to coding, 
however, several themes were expanded to include subthemes.  
 
Results  
The analysis of data revealed three initial themes: What is cybercrime?; the challenges 
associated with investigating cybercrime;  and a lack of effective and consistent training for 
cybercrime. Additional subthemes were also identified, each of which are discussed in the 
context of the overarching themes.  
 
Difficulties Defining Cybercrime 
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In the context of the first theme it  was evident that although participants attempted to provide 
tangible interpretations for what cybercrime is and what it involves, there is still a great deal of 
confusion about what is meant or included in the term. There were numerous instances where 
participants stressed the huge variety of activities that the term cybercrime could cover: 
 
‘…you look at the vastness of those tags that we’re now putting on to cyber crime...’ 
(RS3, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘…cybercrime is so ambiguous and so vague.’ (RS2, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘…quite varied I guess.’ (RS2, Focus Group 1) 
  
‘…because it’s just too vast.’ (RS4, Focus Group 3) 
 
Words used to describe cybercrime include ‘vast’, ‘ambiguous’, and ‘vague’. There has 
been a great deal of discussion on how cybercrime is defined and the public understanding 
of cybercrime (Wall, 2007; Wall, 2008b). However, it appears that those working in 
frontline aspects of law enforcement agencies are also facing a similar struggle, this being 
clearly highlighted in several extracts from the focus groups:  
 
‘I think sometimes it’s good to have a word that we all have a general 
understanding of and people out there have a general understanding of, to kind of 
give people confidence that we can work towards helping them or at least give 
them some reassurance with it.’ (RS2, Focus Group 1) 
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‘You then referred to cyber crime, you’re asking us, you know, what base could we 
need to deal with cyber crime, and I think police ourselves, tell us what it is first.’ 
(RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
It is evident that many of the officers who have to deal with aspects of cybercrime on a daily 
basis feel unprepared to do so, often feeling that they should have a deeper level of knowledge. 
This is more prominent in the second quotation, where the participant expresses the feeling 
that if the general public are asking them about aspects of cybercrime, they should have a good 
basic knowledge of the area. Holt and Bossler (2012) suggested that it is important for all officers 
to have a rudimentary working knowledge of the diverse range of crimes they may come into 
contact with. In many cases, individuals will be assigned to cases on the basis of availability 
rather than specialism, hence they need sufficient knowledge to deal with enquiries effectively 
(Holt and Bossler, 2012).  
 
The Challenges of Investigating Cybercrime 
A key theme in the focus groups related directly to the investigation of cybercrime. Two sub-
themes emerged from this overarching theme: feelings of frustration and powerlessness when 
dealing with cybercrime; and the paradox between the fast speed of development in 
cybercrime and the slow and laborious investigation process. 
 
Frustrations Related to a Lack of Knowledge and Power to Deal with Cybercrime 
Many of the participants had experienced some level of frustration or feelings of powerlessness 
when dealing with aspects of cybercrime. These feelings related to a perception that 
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investigating cybercrime is pointless, with the perpetrators never being bought to justice. A 
perceived lack of relevant knowledge surrounding aspects of cybercrime also served to 
generate feelings of frustration, with many participants not knowing how best to deal with calls 
from the public: 
 
 ‘Yeah, you do feel frustrated sometimes.  Because we tag it for the cyber team and 
they often add some very useful things that the officers can ask, but you think, 
where’s it going?  How are we going to stop this?’ (RS1, Focus Group) 
 
‘When you take that call or you’ve got that job in front of you, you often feel, what 
are we going to do?  Because we’re never going to find these people.  So there’s a 
feeling of powerlessness sometimes.’ (RS1, Focus Group 1) 
 
‘…it feels really frustrating that we can't get any further, we can't trace where these 
people are.’ (RS4, Focus Group 1) 
 
‘… it’s almost feeling powerless in yourself to actually advise properly on how you 
can help them.’ (RS1, Focus Group 1) 
 
‘…you feel powerless.’ (RS1, Focus Group 1) 
 
‘I just –you come across as incompetent and it just- they’re coming to you for advice 
and help and then you just look like a –I’m always honest with people. I said, ‘You’ll 
have to forgive me, it’s the first time I’ve come across it’ (RS4, Focus Group 3) 
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The frequent use of the word ‘powerless’ was a prominent feature of the focus group 
discussions, particularly in relation to bringing the perpetrators of such crimes to justice. There 
is a potential for such thoughts and feelings to bias officers approach to dealing with and 
processing these crimes, and if they believe there is little point in pursing such reports, this 
could have a variety of knock on effects, including aspects of under-reporting.  
 
The Contrast between the Speed at which Cybercrime Develops Versus the Speed of 
Investigation 
Within the focus groups, it became apparent that the participants had great difficulty keeping 
track of the development of cybercrime offences and the speed that cybercrime offences 
evolve. They noted that there is a constant change and new things come up all the time, from 
different techniques to new applications and social media platforms: 
 
‘…Yeah, it’s like legal highs. They are constantly changing... ‘ (RS2, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘But it’s a constant thing, it’s like you say. There’s a new app that’s come out now, 
the new social media, it’s constant.’ (RS1, Focus Group 3) 
 
‘…something else is going to be a big thing in a minute and we’re already outdated 
on that.’ (RS1, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘…because like two years ago Facebook was a bit thing, but now it’s snapchat.’ 
(RS1, Focus Group 2) 
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‘…they’re two or three levels ahead of us already, aren’t they, these people? They 
know what’s coming. They know where they’re going.’ (RS2, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘…because technology’s moved on so quickly...’ (RS4, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘..you think how far behind are we? We’ve not even thought that this is even 
possible and somebody’s already doing it and they’re already a step behind –step 
ahead and we just chasing and keep chasing till we get there, and there’s nothing 
there.’ (RS1, Focus Group 2) 
 
Many of the respondents focused directly on the speed of development in technology, and the 
constant drive to keep up with these changes. This is particularly evident in the quotation from 
RS1, Focus Group 2 who acknowledges this constant state of always being one step behind 
when in comes to being abreast of current threats from cybercrime: 
 
The constantly evolving cyber threat landscape is sharply contrasted with the perceived speed 
at which participants seen the progression of investigations related to cybercrime: 
  
 ‘and not only from handling the call in the first place, we then obviously make a 
decision on whether it’s going to be a response to the job… cyber crime is more 
slower time at the moment…’ (RS1, Focus Group 1) 
 
‘…there is nothing quick about investigating cybercrime…it’s a slow thing.’ (RS2, 
Focus Group 2) 
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‘…criminals and crime now move a lighting speed, whereas we are still at snail’s 
pace unfortunately.’  
 
‘It would take us a year to look at a known drug dealer’s phone. It’s pointless after 
a year; you might as well just not bother’ (RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
There is a consistent view that the investigation process sitting behind most cybercrimes is ‘a 
slow thing’ or progresses ‘at a snail’s pace’. It is unclear how the officers in these focus groups 
drew their evidence from which to base their opinions on the progress of such investigations, 
but the view was evident throughout all four of the focus group sessions. 
 
A Lack of Specialist Resources 
In the context of investigating cybercrime and dealing with contact from the public, a number 
of participants highlighted a clear lack of specialist resources devoted to such an issue. Many 
perceived this issues to be of critical importance, and felt that as the impact of cybercrime and 
the amount of time dealing with issues related to it were increasing, there had been a gradual 
reduction in officers with specialism in this area: 
 
‘we’re struggling.’ (RS3, Focus Group 3) 
 
‘…So I think I ended up point-to-pointing someone because it was out of hours, it 
was weekend and I’m sure there are DMIs that are on or on call, but does that 
really warrant?..’ (RS3, Focus Group 3) 
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 ‘…We need SPOCs really, don’t we? We need SPOCs on shift, on PRT, in MAU, in 
the control room, so someone who’s always one and scattered it around that way 
really.’ (RS3, Focus Group 3) 
 
‘………they reckon there’s too many trained people, but there aren’t enough.’ 
(RS4, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘…of all our business have some kind of digital element and we’ve got five dedicate 
people.’ (RS4, Focus Group 4) 
 
One of the participants in focus group 3 mentioned the concept of having a Single Point of 
Contact (SPOC) for aspects related to cybercrime who were attached to different departments 
within force headquarters. Individuals saw this as a more effective resource as they had 
someone they knew they could approach, irrespective of time of day, with their requests for 
information. The dedicated Digital Media Investigation team present within force headquarters 
were also mentioned as a noted resource, but even then they were seen as a time-limited 
resource, not available out of normal office hours. The requirement for having specialist officers 
who have advanced knowledge of cybercrimes has also been highlighted in previous research 
by Hinduja (2004). Officers in this study suggested that more advanced skills and knowledge in 
areas such as hacking, cracking, password protection, and encryption would assist them in 
cybercrime prevention. Although many forces are moving towards dedicated units to deal with 
the threat from cybercrime, it may also be worth exploring the potential to have dedicated 
SPOCs that operate in conjunction with such teams, but are accessible outside of office hours.  
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Lack of Effective and Consistent Training for Dealing with Cybercrime 
Overall, the participants shared little positive feedback about their training on cybercrime. 
Many referenced an online training system that was supplied by National Centre for Applied 
Learning Technologies (NCALT) in their discussions, whilst others claimed that they had 
received no formal training in the area, even though they were expected to deal with these 
types of enquiries on a day-to-day basis. 
 
Lack of Formal Training 
In discussion with the participants in the focus groups, it became apparent that very few of 
them could actually identify when and how they had received formal training related to aspects 
of cybercrime: 
 
‘I started in the IMU two years ago and I have had no training whatsoever in 
cyber crime; I am expected to pick it up as I go along. ‘ (RS2, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘I haven’t got a clue. I got it off my office-often from them team that taught me 
what to do in that role, but there’s no formal training.’ (RS4, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘You do your two years probationary, you come out your training, you can now 
deal with everything that comes at you. ‘ (RS4, Focus Group 2) 
 
In the first extract, the participant noted that they had been in post for two years, but had 
received no formal training in how to deal with aspects of cybercrime. There is also an 
associated expectation that the officer was to learn about the area as they gained more 
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experience. Others expressed a similar experience, with participants claiming that they gained 
their knowledge through others on the team. This finding has some connection with findings 
from previous research by Hinduja (2004) who noted that many officers rated training in 
aspects of investigation and evidence gathering as being of critical importance in the context 
of cybercrime. 
 
Ineffectiveness of Online Training 
Nearly all of the participants had experience of using NCALT, and viewed it negatively in terms 
of its overall effectiveness as a learning platform for issues related to cybercrime. Participants 
made disparaging comments about the training, using words such as ‘crap’, ‘rubbish’ and 
‘boring’. These perspectives are demonstrated in the extracts presented below:  
 
‘…you know you’re just going to have a bad time.  It’s not encouraging to do at 
all.’ (RS1, Focus Group 2,r1,22) 
 
Int: ‘Where did you get your training from? 
R4: NCALT 
R3: NCALT 
Is it effective? 
R3: It’s rubbish.  
R2: It’s not.  
 (RS2, 3, and 4, Focus Group 3) 
 
‘……Yeah, and it’s to put a tick in a box.’ 
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(RS4, Focus Group 3) 
 
‘I was going to say, it’s usually online, rubbish’ (RS2, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘Oh, is it NCALT? Which is the, yeah, worst thing ever.’ (RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘I think just about 90% of people would say that isn’t a work- isn’t something that 
works very well.’ (RS4, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘…I mean NCALT is terrible because you’re taught at basically and it’s like you sit 
and you watch and that’s it...’ (RS2, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘It’s not the way to learn.’ (RS3, Focus Group 4) 
 
As can be seen, the effective of the NCALT system for specialised training related to cybercrime 
fell below par for many of the officers present in the focus group sessions. 
 
Another aspect related to the perceived ineffectiveness of NCALT links into the fluidity of the 
area of cybercrime. NCALT is an e-learning platform that is designed and distributed to police 
officers, but appears not to be frequently updated. As a result, may of the participants saw the 
NCALT system as being out-dated and less informative: 
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‘NCALT is never going to be effective and I stand by this purely because – for 
cybercrime, at least that’s for cybercrime, because it’s always going to be out-
dated. ‘ (RS1, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘…it’s already dated because it’s been developed three years ago, it’s been put 
into production two years ago and it took a year to produce it so it’s here now.  
So actually that product has been developed three years ago and we get 
training on ….. about how crime affects Facebook and Snapchat, by the time 
we get it, it’s something else.’ (RS1, Focus Group 2) 
 
New offenses come up ‘online has opened up a whole raft of different offences 
that never existed certainly when I joined’. (RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
The effectiveness of e-learning platforms has come into question over recent years, particularly 
in the context of work-based education and training (Boulay, Coultas, & Luckin, 2008). A variety 
of mediating factors have been suggested to account for the effectiveness of such systems, 
including the level of computer literacy the individual learner has, alongside how well it 
provides a personalised experience (Birzina, Kalnina, Janevica, & Cernova, 2009), and 
motivational factors (Boulay et al., 2008). It would appear that many of the participants in the 
current study felt that the current NCALT system was out-dated and did not provide them with 
sufficient engagement to warrant their full engagement, hence limiting the actual retention of 
information. Many participants had the attitude that it was something that had to be done as 
quickly as possible in order to get it out of the way, with many stating that it had to be done in 
their own time. 
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How to Increase the Effectiveness of Training? 
According to police officers, training should be more straightforward and to the point in order 
for it to be effective. They all noted that more interactive methods are needed for gaining a 
better understanding for cybercrime. In several instances they mentioned that having a real-
life session with someone is far more effective than e-learning, which requires less involvement 
and connection with the learner. Police officers also mentioned that group discussions are 
helpful, as they provide opportunities sharing information, exchanging and debating 
information and issues: 
 
‘Good examples would be nice.’ (RS3, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘I think if you’re in a group, you- like we are today, we’re all bouncing off each 
other and that’s why the conversation has not really sort of stopped…plus it keeps 
you awake a bit more, doesn’t; it, that if you’re like- then it’s oh, it’s like 
PowerPoint basically, it’s just another screen.’ (RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
 ‘…and one of the training days we had cyber crime come in, only for literally an 
hour, bang, bang, bang, but they focused on smartphones.’ (RS2, Focus Group 2) 
 
‘and that is a good example of teaching (focus group).’ (RS1, Focus Group 4) 
 
‘…If you have something like that where you’ve got somebody who’s engaging, 
really loves the job and wants to get it across to you...’ (RS3, Focus Group 4) 
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The effectiveness of security awareness campaigns, which has some analogy to the current area 
of training, has been explored in previous research (Bada, Sasse, & Nurse, 2014). The authors 
present a series of recommendations, with one of the key aspects being the education aspect 
has to be more that just presenting individuals with lots of information. The researchers 
suggested that education and training has to be ‘targeted, actionable, doable, and provide 
feedback’ (Bada, Sasse, & Nurse, 2014). Khan, Alghathbar, Nabi, and Khan (2011) found that 
academic presentations from guest speakers or group-based discussions had the greatest 
potential to enhance knowledge and attitudes towards aspects of cybersecurity. In contrast 
emails, newsletters, and computer-based training all had limited effectiveness (Khan, 
Alghathbar, Nabi, and Khan, 2011). These elements could be taken on board in terms of 
developing more effective and robust training for frontline officers who have to deal with 
aspects of cybercrime on a daily basis.  
 
Conclusion 
The current work aimed to explore the perceptions, attitudes, and challenges a group of front 
line police officers faced in dealing with cybercrime. This work is seen as a critical starting point 
from which to build a wider discussion about the issues raised, and focuses directly on the 
experiences of frontline officers rather than academic-based interpretations. 
 
The work is of critical importance for a variety of reasons, particularly as forces are expected to 
present an agile and response position in the context of growing cyber-threat. The key issues 
highlighted in this study surround the effectiveness of understanding the terminology related 
to cybercrime. If officers have a clearer understanding of the key facets related to cybercrime, 
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they could ensure that potential victims of such attacks can be supported effectively, as well as 
ensuring relevant evidence is collected in line with accepted protocols. It is clear that many 
officers have experienced a degree of frustration or sense of powerlessness when it comes to 
dealing with cybercrime, which again needs to be tackled at both an individual and 
organisational level. Motivation through more effective training techniques, as well as a clear 
pathway to measure the effectiveness of such, would appear to be the most salient solution for 
such an issue. Key mechanisms to achieve this could involve the development and use of more 
immersive education techniques, or more specific training being given by experts in the field of 
cybercrime. This element has been echoed in previous work exploring the effectiveness of 
cyber security training, showing that professionally organised and prepared training is the most 
effective (Bada et al., 2014). Many of the participants in the current study focused on the lack 
of clear training methods for cybercrime awareness. Where such training did exist, it was 
viewed as being ineffective, boring and disengaging, limiting the capacity for actionable 
knowledge to be imparted.  
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